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COMMENT

Violent Crimes at ATMs: Analysis of the
Liability of Banks and the Regulation of
Protective Measures
INTRODUCTION

On the evening of August 14, 1993, Lloyd Foster went to a walk-up
automated teller machine ("ATM") on Chicago's south side with his fiance,
Bertha Gurley, and their two small children. After withdrawing some cash,
Foster was robbed at gunpoint. The gunman then jumped into Foster's car
and, after a struggle, shot Gurley in the head. The man fled with fifty
dollars. Gurley died a few days later. Subsequently, the bank placed a
night security guard at the ATM.'
Some banking industry officials and law enforcement officers believe
that Foster, Gurley, and others who suffer from ATM crime are just victims
of infrequent, random criminal acts.2 No one is quite sure of the exact
number of ATM crimes that occur because all incidents are not reported to
a central agency.3 Nevertheless, some security -experts contend that the
actual amount of ATM crime that occurs in this country is considerably
larger than initial bank surveys show.4
1. Michael Martinez & Jerry Thornton, Man Held in Slaying After ATM Robbery,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 18, 1993, § 2, at 6. Coincidentally, the man arrested for the attack on
Gurley had also robbed a woman of $60 at gunpoint less than two weeks earlier at the very
same ATM. Id.
2. Industry officials point to a Bank Administration Institute ("BAI") survey that
found only one occurrence of crime per 3.5 million ATM transactions. Rob Wright, Risky
Business; ATM Have Been Heraldedfor Easy Delivery of Services. Unfortunately, Thieves
Find Them Just as Convenient, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12, 1988, at 11. As an FBI spokesman
said after a recent robbery at a Chicago ATM, "[ATM crime is] not an enormous volume
type crime. There are more crimes of this nature than in previous years because there are
more machines." Robert Becker & Jennifer Lenhart, ATM Trail Leads to Kidnapping Arrest,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 1993, § 2, at 1.
3. William A. Hawthorne, How to Increase CustomerSafety at ATMs, ABA BANKING
J., Jan. 1991, at 34.
4. Louis R. Mizell Jr., a security consultant from Bethesda, Maryland, maintains a
computerized database on robberies and other crimes. He contends "[t]he reality is that tens
of thousands of ATM-related crimes occur across the country." Bill Miller, Instant Banking
Inspires Abductions, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1993, at D1.
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Whether the banking industry experts or the security experts are correct
is irrelevant because those ATM users who are victims of crime run a high
risk of being injured or killed. 5 In addition, an increasing number of
victims are being systematically abducted from other locations, taken to
6,
ATMs, and forced to withdraw cash for their captors. Moreover, ATM7
and other violent crime is not exclusively a problem of large urban areas.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that as financial institutions continue to increase
9
the number of ATMs,8 diversify their locations, and expand the services
5. The BAI study showed that of the 285 incidents reported by 177 banks, most were
armed robberies. Wright, supra note 2, at 11. One security consultant, Louis Mizell, claims

that in recent years at least 25 people have been killed and hundreds of others kidnapped,
raped or injured as a result of ATM crime. Miller, supra note 4, at DI. As former Chicago
Police Superintendent Leroy Martin once said, "Inever use a Cash Station [the Illinois-based
ATM network]. I got a gun. Now if police officers that are armed won't use Cash Stations,
what in the devil are you guys doing standing at a Cash Station?" Richard Ringer, Chicago
ProposalAddresses ATM Security, AM. BANKER, July 13, 1989, at 6.
6. See Becker & Lenhart, supra note 2, at I (woman abducted from an Oak Brook,
Illinois shopping mall and held at knifepoint while captor drove from bank to bank forcing
her to withdraw money); Joseph A. Kirby, Marine Questioned in Abduction of Elgin Woman,
lot and
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1993, § 2, at 5 (woman abducted at gunpoint from parking
Users
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the street and taken to ATM); Richard Ringer, Shooting at ATM Prompts Class-Action
Lawsuit, AM. BANKER, June 23, 1989, at 2 (university student abducted from her apartment
building, forced to withdraw $400 and then killed).
A new twist to the crime was created by a team of robbers that held victims
overnight in a motel so that the ATM cards could be used again the following day. This was
done in order to avoid the limits most banks impose on the total amount of cash that can be
withdrawn during one day using a single card. Miller, supra note 4, at D1.
7. An analysis of 1992 FBI crime statistics shows that in the second tier of American
cities, those with populations of three hundred thousand to one million, violent crime rose
by three percent, compared to a six percent drop in cities with over one million inhabitants.
See Patrick T. Reardon & William Recktenwald, Chicago Among Top in U.S. Violent-Crime
Rankings, CHIi. TRIB., Oct. 3, 1993, § 2, at 1, 3. Violent crime is defined as murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. See Karen Tumulty,
Slight Crime Dip Gives No Solace: First Decline in 8 Years Offset by Rise in Violent
Offenses, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 3, 1993, at A15. See also Michael J.Yelnosky, Comment,
Business Inviters' Duty To Protect Invitees Front CriminalActs, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 883, 885
(1986) (showing that many rural states have experienced huge increases in violent crime
during the last two decades).
8. By 1992, there were 87,330 ATMs installed in the United States. See Bill Virgin,
ATM Fees Rising as Quickly as You Can Get Cash, Ciii. TRIB., Oct. 14, 1993, § 6, at 3.
According to industry statistics, ATM installations continue to grow annually by approximately 12%. See Matt Barthel, ATM Growth -Putsa Lid on Branch Costs, AM. BANKER,
Dec. 7, 1992, at 1, 3. Off-premise ATMs, those installed at a location other than a bank
facility, continue to increase 18.5% annually, as compared to a 6.5% growth rate of ATMs
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offered at these ATMs,"° the user base will continue to increase,"1 and so
2
will the potential for violent crime.'
With the rise in ATM crime, there has been a corresponding decline in
consumer confidence in the safety measures taken by banks. 13 While some
industry officials contend that "most" ATMs already have security
measures, 4 these are usually devices such as internal alarms that protect

located in banking offices. See Automated Teller Machines at Top Banking Companies, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 7, 1992, at 15A.
9. ATMs are commonly located in bank lobbies, grocery stores, shopping malls,
convenience stores, schools, hospitals, and airports. See Alan Gart, How Technology is
Changing Banking, 1 J. RETAIL BANKING 35, 42 (1992). In addition, new technology is
allowing mobile ATMs to appear at temporary locations such as state fairs, sporting events,
and even disaster sites. Deidre Sullivan, Rolling Cash Machines are Drawing Attention to
Fleet Financial,AM. BANKER'S MGMT. STRATEGIES, May 24, 1993, at 15A.
10. Every ATM user is aware that an ATM can be used to withdraw cash, make
deposits, or transfer funds between accounts. In addition, many banks are either currently
offering or testing a variety of new non-traditional services, including the ability to make
mortgage and credit card payments, loan applications, to receive bank statements, grocery
coupons, food stamps and other welfare benefits, and to purchase postage stamps, retail gift
certificates, theater tickets, and bus passes. See Ellen Pollock, EFT Profits are Hardto Find,
BANKERS MONTHLY, May 1990, at 65, 67; Sharon Stangenes, Expanding Reach of ATMs:
Convenience a Mixed Blessing for Banks, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 1993, § 4, at 1, 4; John
Waggoner, ATMs Poisedfor 'Gee Whiz' Revolution, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 1993, at lB.
11. Currently, more than half of all American bank customers use ATMs. Pollock,
supra note 10, at 69. One study shows that because of the huge growth in ATMs and drivethrough bank branches, as many as 80% of all bank customers now prefer not to even enter
a bank facility. Stangenes, supra note 10, at 1. According to the American Bankers
Association ("ABA"), more than seven billion transactions were conducted at ATMs in 1992,
up from less than five million transactions in 1988. Virgin, supra note 8, at 3.
12. Assuming that the ratio of one occurrence of ATM crime per 3.5 million
transactions has remained constant, with over seven billion transactions now occurring
annually, this would equate to approximately 2000 annual acts of ATM crime. See statistics
cited supra note 2. Considering the high likelihood of injury to the victims, the potential
threat of ATM crime-related injuries and deaths dwarf the "large number" of 84 injuries and
deaths that originally prompted Congress to enact the Bank Protection Act. See S. REP. No.
1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2530, 2532.
13. One independent study shows that a high percentage of bank patrons believe that
certain security devices, such as surveillance cameras, ATM telephones, and "hot button"
alarms connected directly to police, add greatly to their safety. Nevertheless, ABA data
shows that less than 3% of all banks have installed the "hot button" alarms and fewer than
10% have telephones located at their ATMs. Matt Barthel, Consmners See ATMs as Short
on Safety, AM. BANKER, Sept. 8, 1993, at 20.
14. The President of Cash Station, Inc., the largest operator of ATMs in Illinois,
estimates that 70% of their ATMs have some sort of security measures. Becker & Lenhart,
supra note 2, at 1, 4.
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the ATM itself, and not the customer. 5 In addition, since restitution from
the criminal is generally not available, victims of ATM crime are filing an
increasing number of lawsuits against financial institutions that own
ATMs.' 6 As a result of decreasing consumer confidence and increasing
litigation, there has been a renewed push for legislation requiring security
measures. 17
This comment begins by exploring whether litigation against business
owners provides adequate redress for business invitees who are injured by
the criminal acts of third parties. The common law basis of the liability of
the business owner focuses primarily on the negligence of the business
owner in preventing the criminal acts. Case law is examined in order to
determine whether it is appropriate to apply this precedent to banks for the
injuries of ATM crime victims.' After concluding that the common law
provides an inadequate measure of satisfaction or protection for ATM users,
the federal and state regulation of banks and ATMs is examined in order to
determine whether current regulatory means serve as adequate protection for
the users of ATMs and the victims of ATM crime. Finally, due to the
current general lack of protection provided for ATM users by both the
courts and legislators a statute, applicable in any state, is proposed in order
to provide a minimum level of physical security for ATMs and their users.
The requirements of this statute also serve as the minimum standard of care
required of ATM operators. This will benefit ATM consumers by
enhancing the safety of all ATMs. Moreover, a clearly defined standard of
15. A 1987 ABA study showed that 93% of the reporting banks had alarms, while only
51% had surveillance cameras. Julia Anderson, Laws Do Not Shed Light on Crime, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 12,1988, at 12. As of 1993, still only about half of all banks had installed
some sort of security camera at their ATMs. Barthel, supra note 13, at 20. This means that,
of the more than 87,000 ATMs currently installed in the United States, more than 42,000
could be without any type of security camera surveillance.
16. According to a BAI survey, the number of lawsuits filed seeking damages for
injuries resulting from ATM-related crime increased from I% of all incidents in 1987 to 11%
of all incidents in 1989. William R. Wipprecht, Strike Back at ATM Crime, BANK MGMT.,
Aug. 1991, at 33, 34.
17. Recently, numerous cities and states have proposed or passed legislation requiring
minimum security standards for ATMs. See infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text
(regarding recent ATM legislation).
18. Throughout this comment it is generally assumed that an ATM user is a business
invitee and that the bank operating an ATM is a business owner. Circumstances where a
bank leases the physical space for an ATM from a third party involves landlord-tenant law
and are beyond the scope of this comment. In addition, the terms "bank" and "financial
institution" are used generically throughout this comment. However, the analysis is
applicable to all operators of ATMs, including banks, savings and loans, credit unions, or
other businesses.
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care will increase the likelihood that an ATM crime victim will be
successful in litigation against a financial institution that breaches the
standard of care, and thus provide the victim with compensation for his or
her injuries. Consequently, financial institutions will benefit from increased
consumer confidence in ATM safety and a reduction in the ambiguity of
current security requirements.
I.

NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY OF BANKS FOR

ATM CRIME

The prior instances of litigation involving ATM crime have primarily
attempted to place liability on banks for the criminal conduct of third parties
using a negligence theory." Generally, in an action for negligence, the
plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to
conform to a certain standard of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) which
is the proximate cause of the resulting injury, and (4) actual loss or
damages.2'
If an ATM consumer is injured during a robbery, he or she will
obviously suffer actual damages, either from a monetary loss, physical
injury, or both. Therefore, the important issues in suits involving ATM
crimes are: whether a duty is owed by the bank to the ATM user to meet a
standard of care by providing a reasonably safe business environment,
whether the standard of care is breached by the bank's failing to provide
minimum security features or warn users of potential risks, and whether the
bank's breach of the duty was the proximate cause of the injury.21
The main focus in deciding whether a duty exists is the determination
of whether the plaintiff's injury was foreseeable to the bank.22 If the bank
has sufficient knowledge or notice of the risk of harm, then a subsequent
injury can be considered foreseeable and a duty will arise to protect the
ATM user from criminal attacks by third parties.23 In their defense,
defendants in ATM crime suits generally claim that the criminal act of a
third party is an unforeseeable independent act which intervened and was the

19. See generally Williams v. First Ala. Bank, 545 So.2d 26 (Ala. 1989); Popp v. Cash
Station, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1150 (Iil. App. Ct. 1992); Dyer v. Norstar Bank, 186 A.D.2d 1083
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Page v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1991).
20. See, e.g., Rowe v. State Bank, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1364 (I11.1988). See also W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].

21.
22.
App. Ct.
23.

See generally cases cited supra note 19.
See, e.g., Popp, 613 N.E.2d at 1153; Taylor v. Hocker, 428 N.E.2d 662, 664 (Il.
1981).
But see Taylor, 428 N.E.2d at 664.
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actual proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, thus relieving the defendant
from any liability for his or her own negligence.2 4 Nevertheless, an Illinois
appellate court has held that the intervening criminal act of a third party
does not relieve a negligent actor of liability if the intervening criminal act
was itself foreseeable.2" Thus, whether the bank's breach of the standard
of care is the proximate cause of the injury is again a question of foreseeability. Since both the existence of the duty and the proximate cause of the
injury rely on the existence of foreseeability, the main focus of this section
will be whether the criminal acts of third parties are foreseeable, thus
causing a duty to arise on the part of the bank.
There does not exist a general duty to warn a person of, or protect a
person from, the criminal acts of third parties.26 Likewise, business owners
historically have had no duty to warn or protect persons on their property
from intentional criminal acts of third parties.27 Business owners were free
to conduct normal business on the assumption that the criminal law would
be followed. 28 An important exception to this general non-duty is when
the victim of a criminal act is present on the business property because of
an invitation extended by the merchant.2 9
The courts that have considered a landowner's duty to invitees have
consistently held that, although owners of land are not insurers of their
customers' safety, the owner has a duty to take reasonable measures to
protect customers from injuries caused by the foreseeable criminal acts of

24. See generally cases cited supra note 19.
25. Orrico, 440 N.E.2d at 257. Accord Rowe, 531 N.E.2d at 1368. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
26. See, e.g., Rowe v. State Bank, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1364 (I1. 1988). See also
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 20, § 63. See generally E.L. Kellett, Annotation, Private
Person'sDuty and Liabilityfor Failureto Protect Another Against CrininalAttack by Third
Person, 10 A.L.R.3d 619 (1966 & Supp. 1994).
27. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698 (1986);
Yelnosky, supra note 7.
28. See generally Zacharias, supra note 27.
29. See JOSEPH A. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY §§ 4.1-.5 (2d ed. 1988).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965). Section 344 states:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his
business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they
are upon the land for such purpose, for physical harm caused by the
accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or
animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise
to protect them against it.
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unknown third persons.3" The Restatement (Second) of Torts 3 ("Restatement") has suggested that the required reasonable measures include the duty
to provide security precautions and police the premises.32 A central issue
in most cases involving landowner liability is whether the criminal acts of
third parties were foreseeable under the particular circumstances.33
Although foreseeability is essentially a question of fact, 3 there is a
significant amount of precedent which addresses whether a triable issue of
foreseeability exists within the particular facts of the case.35 Courts have
typically adopted one of three different approaches to determine the
foreseeability of criminal acts of third parties: specific harm, prior similar
incidents and totality of the circumstances.
A. SPECIFIC HARM TEST

In the first approach, foreseeability, and thus liability, is limited to
circumstances when the business owner is aware of the imminent probability
of a specific harm to the invitee. 36 For example, in Cornpropst v. Sloan,-

30. See Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Taco Bell,
Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1987); Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987);
Taylor v. Hocker, 428 N.E.2d 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Martinko v. H-N-W Assocs., 393
N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1986); Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Butler
v. Acme Mkts., 426 A.2d 521 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981), affd, 445 A.2d 1141 (N.J.
1982); Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E2d 451 (N.Y. 1980); Foster v. Winston-Salem
Joint Venture, 281 S.E.2d 36 (N.C. 1981); Daily v. K-Mart Corp., 458 N.E.2d 471 (Ohio
C.P. 1981). But see Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
32. In relevant part, the Restatement reads:
Duty to police premises. Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's
safety, he is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has
reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to
occur. He may, however, know or have reason to know, from past experience, that
there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in general which is I
likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even though he has no reason to expect
it on the part of any particular individual. If the place or character of his business,
or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or
criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular
time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to provide a
reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965) (second emphasis added).
33. See PAGE, supra note 29, §§ 11.3-.12. See also Yelnosky, supra note 7, at 891900 (discussing the foreseeability of criminal acts of third parties).
34. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 659 (Cal. 1985).
35. See infra notes 36-100 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975). The Tennessee
Supreme Court stated:
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the plaintiff was the victim of a sudden vicious attack by an unknown
38
assailant in the parking lot of the mall where she had been shopping.
The parking lot had been the setting for a variety of assaults and other acts
39 Despite these prior
of violence prior to the attack upon the plaintiff.
4
incidents, the mall failed to take precautionary steps to deter future crime.
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in holding for the business owner, refused
to adopt the approach of the Restatement because of the vagueness of the
of imposing liability for
standard of care required and the unfairness
4'
persons.
third
of
acts
spontaneous criminal
Since ATMs are unmanned, a bank would never be aware of a specific
imminent danger to one of its customers. Therefore, in the minority of
jurisdictions that follow the Cornpropst reasoning, it would apparently be
impossible to hold a financial institution liable for a criminal act occurring
at its ATM.4 2
31

B. PRIOR SIMILAR INCIDENTS TEST

With the second approach, the courts have applied the language of the
43
Restatement to develop a more expansive definition of foreseeability.
These courts focus on the existence of prior similar incidents to determine

There is no duty upon the owners or operators of a shopping center...
whose mode of operation of their premises does not attract or provide a
climate for crime, to guard against the criminal acts of a third party, unless
they know or have reason to know that acts are occurring or about to occur
on the premises that pose imminent probability of harm to an invitee;
whereupon a duty of reasonable care to protect against such act arises.
Id. at 198. This rule was subsequently expanded to apply to all business owners. Page v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d 133, 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
37. 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975).
38. Id. at 190.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 190-91.
41. "[[In our opinion it is patently unfair and unjust to impose the vague duty of
Section 344 Restatement of Torts (Second) on the shopkeepers and merchants . . . for the
sudden criminal acts of unknown and unidentified persons." Id. at 195.
42. This is demonstrated in Page v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d
133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). The plaintiff was robbed and assaulted while withdrawing
money from defendant's ATM. Id. at 133. The court applied the Cornpropst rule in
reversing a jury verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 140. "[T~he sudden intentional criminal acts
of the unidentified assailants, which could not have been prevented or deterred by the
exercise of reasonable care by the Bank, was the sole proximate cause of harm to the
Plaintiff." Id.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965). See suqra note 32 for
the text of comment f.
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whether the particular crime was foreseeable." In absence of a history of
similar acts in the geographic area of the disputed incident, jurisdictions
following this approach decide the foreseeability issue as a question of
law.45 There are generally three elements that courts weigh in the prior
similar incidents analysis: (1) the similarity of the incident in question to
prior incidents, (2) the frequency and recency of the other incidents, and (3)
the location where all of the incidents occurred.46
When considering the similarity of the disputed incident to prior
incidents, courts often require a high degree of similarity among the crimes
in order to find a duty to protect. For instance, shoplifting or petty theft
will not make an armed robbery or murder foreseeable.47 In Taylor v.
Hocker,48 an Illinois appellate court determined that there was no duty on
the part of a shopping mall to protect customers from violent attacks,
although numerous prior incidents of shoplifting and auto theft had occurred
at the mall.4 9 The court suggested that if the facts indicated a business
owner was aware of a history of assaults on customers or that the area was
frequented by undesirable characters, then a duty may arise. 0
Courts have also been very limiting when considering the frequency
and recency of the prior incidents. In order for the prior incidents to make
the disputed incident foreseeable to the business owner, there must be
numerous similar incidents that have occurred in the fairly recent past.5'
For instance, the Supreme Court of Alabama, in Williams v. FirstAlabama
Bank,5 2 held that knowledge of two prior armed robberies at the same bank
was insufficient to determine that the armed robbery of the plaintiff, while
44. See, e.g., Martinko v. H-N-W Assocs., 393 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1986).

45. Id. at 322.

46. See, e.g., Moye v. A.G. Gaston Motels, Inc., 499 So. 2d 1368, 1372 (Ala. 1986).
The Moye court stated that "[w]hen the number and frequency of the crimes on the premises
rises, and notice is shown on the part of the owner, then, and only then, would criminal
activity become reasonably foreseeable." Id. at 1372-73.
47. See, e.g., Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc., 238 S.E.2d 167, 167 (S.C.
1977) (determining that property crimes, such as shoplifting, would not make a violent
criminal attack on a customer foreseeable to a retailer).
48. 428 N.E.2d 662 (111.App. Ct. 1981).
49. Id. at 665.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., McCoy v. Gay, 302 S.E.2d 130, 132 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
a shooting in defendant's parking lot 10 years before plaintiff was attacked in the same
location was too remote to be admissible to show foreseeability); Golombek v. Marine
Midland Bank, 598 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that two similar
robberies within two years did not make the robbery of the plaintiff at the bank's night
depository box foreseeable).
52. 545 So. 2d 26 (Ala. 1989).
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at the bank's ATM, was foreseeable.53 Even though one of the prior
robberies had occurred only nine days before the disputed incident, the prior
acts were neither frequent nor numerous enough to impose a duty upon the
bank.54
Finally, when analyzing prior incidents, most courts require that all the
prior incidents occurred at the exact location where the plaintiff was injured
before they can be considered in determining the foreseeability of the
For example, in Taylor v. Hocker,56 an Illinois
disputed incident."
appellate court held that a violent attack that occurred at an adjacent store
was irrelevant in determining the foreseeability of an attack on the plaintiff,
which occurred at defendant's shopping mall.57
As demonstrated by these cases, courts have traditionally required a
high degree of similarity between prior incidents and the disputed incident
in order to determine that the disputed incident was foreseeable."
Nevertheless, recent case law shows a movement by the courts to expand the
prior similar incidents test so that a wider variety of prior crimes are
considered relevant to foreseeability. For example, in Jardel Co. v.
Hughes,59 the Delaware Supreme Court determined that it was necessary
to consider all of the past crimes that had occurred in the area, including
property crimes, in order to determine the foreseeability of future injuries
from criminal activity. 60 The court allowed over three hundred prior
property crimes that occurred at a mall as evidence towards foreseeability
of a kidnapping and rape that occurred in the mall parking lot. 61 Many
jurisdictions are following this trend and allowing the admission of evidence
53. Id. at 27.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Martinko v. H-N-W Assocs., 393 N.W.2d 320, 322 (Iowa 1986)
(determining that just because the defendant owned numerous malls, at which over one
hundred crimes had occurred, a murder was not foreseeable, as it was the first crime to occur
at the particular location in question).
56. 428 N.E.2d 662 (II1. App. Ct. 1981).
57. Id. at 665.
58. See notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
59. 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987).
60. Id. at 526. The court noted that:
Criminal activity is not easily compartmentalized. So-called "property
crimes," such as shoplifting, may turn violent if a chase ensues.... [T]he
repetition of criminal activity, regardless of its mix, may be sufficient to
place the property owners on notice of the likelihood that personal injury,
not merely property loss, will result.
Id. at 525.
61. Id. at 526. The court affirmed a jury verdict awarding over $500,000 to the
victim. Id. at 521-22.
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crimes in order to show foreseeability
of prior, though not identical, 6property
2
crimes.
violent
of subsequent
In addition to expanding the scope of types of "similar" crimes
considered, there has also been a judicial movement to expand the prior
similar incidents test so that crimes committed at similar businesses are
considered, thus increasing the number of prior crimes to be weighed. For
example, in Torres v. U.S. National Bank,63 the plaintiff was robbed and

shot while making a deposit at defendant's night depository. 64 The court
held that, in determining the foreseeability of the attack, the jury could
consider evidence of robberies at other night depositories in the area.65 In
addition, some jurisdictions are moving towards allowing consideration of
all crimes occurring in the geographic area, especially when the defendant's
business is located in a "high crime area. '66

62. See Morgan v. Bucks Assocs., 428 F. Supp. 546, 548 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (citing
evidence of nearly one hundred auto thefts in less than one year in denying the defendant's
motion for summary judgment). The court reasoned:
The numerous criminal activities that occurred on the parking lot ... were
sufficient for the jury to determine that the defendant knew or had reason
to know, "that there is likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in
general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor."
Id. at 551 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965)). Accord
MacQuarrie v. Howard Johnson Co., 877 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1989); Galloway v. Bankers
Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1988). "[T]here is quite a universal agreement that what
is required to be foreseeable is only the 'general character' or 'general type' of the event or
the harm, and not its 'precise' nature, details, or above all the manner of its occurrence." Id.

at 440 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND. KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

43 (5th ed. 1984)).
63. 670 P.2d 230 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
64. Id. at 232.
65. Id. at 235. See also Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1988).
In Galloway, the court allowed the consideration of expert testimony to the fact that a
homosexual rape in a mall bathroom was foreseeable "due to the high incidents [sic] of
criminal activity in public restrooms in regional shopping centers generally." Id. at 440.
66. See, e.g., MacQuarrie v. Howard Johnson Co., 877 F.2d 126, 128 (1st Cir. 1989)
(considering evidence that a motel's location was well-suited for crime); Brown v. J.C.
Penney Co., 688 P.2d 811, 819 (Or. 1984) (considering crime statistics in the general
neighborhood of defendant's shopping mall). See also Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576
So. 2d 322, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (extending the duty beyond the boundaries of
defendants' business property because of their knowledge that customers used an adjacent
premises in connection with the defendant's business invitation). The Holiday Inns court also
determined that the shooting of three customers in an adjacent parking lot was foreseeable
and affirmed a jury award of over $5 million. Id. at 324, 326.
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C. TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST

Courts that have expanded the prior similar incidents
test are actually
applying, and leading the movement toward, the totality of the circumstances
test. The jurisdictions utilizing this expanded test, by emphasizing other
language of the Restatement, have defined foreseeability in even broader
terms.67 Each and every circumstance surrounding the disputed incident is
examined to determine whether the occurrence of that crime was foreseeable.6 8 While the occurrence of prior similar incidents is still an important
factor in determining foreseeability, it is no longer required for finding the
existence of foreseeability.69
The California Supreme Court was the first major judicial body to
abandon the prior similar incidents test in favor of the totality of the
7
circumstances test. 70 In Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, ' a
doctor was shot during a robbery attempt in defendant hospital's parking
lot.72 At trial, the plaintiff offered evidence that the hospital was located
in a high crime area and that prior assaults had occurred in the emergency
room adjacent to the parking lot. 73 In addition, evidence showed that the
hospital monitored its other parking lots with security cameras and guards;
however, it failed to provide similar security for the lot where the incident
occurred.74 The trial court granted the defendant's motion for nonsuit
stating that the "plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence essential to prove..
notice of prior crimes of the same or similar nature in the same or similar
portion of defendant's premises. 7 5
On appeal, the California Supreme Court declared that "while prior
similar incidents are helpful to determine foreseeability, they are not

67. "If the place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he
should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either
generally or at some particular time .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt.
f (1965) (emphasis added). See supra note 32 for the full text of comment f.
68. See lsaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 659 (Cal. 1985).
69. See id. at 665.
70. Id. See also Stalzer v. European American Bank, 448 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1982) (appearing to apply an equivalent test). In granting judgment for the plaintiff, who
was robbed in defendant's bank, the court weighed the vulnerability of the location, the high
volume of business, the unique nature of the business, and the number of recently publicized
bank robberies. Id. at 635.
71. 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985).
72. Id. at 653.
73. Id. at 654-56.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 657.
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required to establish it." 7 6 The court cited a number of policy reasons for
disposing of the prior similar incidents rule.77 First, the rule leads to
results which are contrary to public policy because it discourages landowners from taking adequate measures to protect their premises which they
know are dangerous.7 8 Second, the rule is unfair because the first victim
will always lose, while subsequent victims are permitted to recover.79
Third, the rule leads to arbitrary results because of the uncertainty as to how
"similar" the prior incidents must be to determine foreseeability.8 0 Fourth,
the rule erroneously equates the foreseeability of a particular act with the
previous occurrences of similar acts. 8' Finally, the rule erroneously
removes too many cases from the consideration of the jury. 2
A number of jurisdictions have followed Isaacs in allowing foreseeability to be determined in light of all the circumstances surrounding the
criminal incident.8 3 In so doing, the courts consider a host of other
circumstances besides prior criminal incidents.8 One of these circumstanc76. Id. at 665.
77. See Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 658-59.
78. Id. at 658.
79. Id. "Surely, a landowner should not get one free assault before he can be held
liable for criminal acts which occur on his property." Id.
80. Id. at 659. "The rule invites different courts to enunciate different standards for
foreseeability ..... Id.
81. Id. "[The fortuitous absence of prior injury does not justify relieving defendant
from responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of its acts." Id.
82. Id. "It is well established that foreseeability is ordinarily a question of fact. It
may be decided as a question of law only if, 'under the undisputed facts there is no room for
a reasonable difference of opinion."' Id. (quoting Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 665
P.2d 947, 950 (Cal. 1983)).
83. See Taco Bell v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 48 (Col. 1987) (en banc); Paterson v.
Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210, 1219-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Moody v. Cawdrey, 721 P.2d
708, 712 n.8 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986); Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506, 510 (Idaho
1990); Rowe v. State Bank, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1369 (111.1988); Galloway v. Bankers Trust
Co., 420 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Iowa 1988); Willie v. American Casualty Co., 547 So. 2d 1075,
1083 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Roettger v. United Hosps., Inc., 380 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986); Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446, 447-48 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); Reitz v. May
Co. Dep't Stores, 583 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Small v. McKennan Hosp.,
403 N.W.2d 410, 413 (S.D. 1986); Ronk v. Parking Concepts, 711 S.W.2d 409, 417 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986); Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 243-44 (Utah 1985) (adopting the
relevant factors specified in Peters v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Wis. 1979).
84. See generally Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572, 578 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (considering the fact that the business was open all night and so may attract more
crime); Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Minn. 1989) (noting that the
unique nature of the parking garage business causes other factors to go towards foresecability
including: location of the facility, the practical feasibility and cost of various security
measures, and the risk of personal harm to customers); Small, 403 N.W.2d at 411-14
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es, which is often weighed when analyzing the totality of the circumstances,
is whether the operation of the business created an "especial temptation" and
oppottunity for criminal conduct.85 That is, businesses that, due to the
unique nature of their operation, have a greater likelihood of being
victimized by criminal acts are categorized as being especial temptations.86
injury
If a business falls within this category, the foreseeability of 8an
7
increases.
greatly
parties
third
of
acts
criminal
the
from
resulting
As of yet, courts have placed a minimal number of businesses into this
category. 8 At least one commentator has proposed that ATMs should fall
within the especial temptation category.8 9 Reasons given for placing
ATMs in this category are analogous to reasons expressed when adopting
the approach to other businesses.9 ° For instance, in Cohen v. Southland
Corp.,91 a California appellate court categorized a convenience store as an
especial temptation because the store's 24-hour operation made it an
attractive target for criminal activity. 92 The court noted that more robberies
occur at night because there are fewer witnesses and darkness conceals the
robbers' escape. 93 This seems to parallel the risks of criminal activity at
ATMs. In addition, a robber knows there is a high probability that an ATM
customer will be carrying cash. Nevertheless, courts have been94generally
unwilling to categorize banks or ATMs as especial temptations.
(weighing testimony of security expert regarding defendant's inadequate security measures
and fact that defendant issued security advisories to its staff); Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 244
(considering community crime rate, industry standards, criminal activity in immediate area
and at similar businesses, and the peculiar security problems posed by the design of the
premises).
85. See Cohen, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
86. Id.
87. See Gomez v. Ticor, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
88. See, e.g., Cohen, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (operating a 24-hour convenience store);
Gomez, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (operating a parking ramp); Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169
(operating a parking ramp); Small, 403 N.W.2d at 413 (operating a hospital and parking
facilities).
89. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 27, at 746 (highlighting the particular dangers of
ATM use).
90. "[M]ore robberies occur at night; fewer people are around to interfere with or
witness the crime. Darkness conceals the robbers' getaway. A 24-hour convenience store
makes an attractive target for night time criminal activity." Cohen, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
91. 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
92. Id. at 578.

93. Id.

94. See Williams v. First Ala. Bank, 545 So. 2d 26, 27 (Ala. 1989) (holding a bank
not liable to a customer who was robbed while using the bank's ATM); Dyer v. Norstar
Bank, 186 A.D.2d 1083, 1083 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (determining that a bank had no
liability for the shooting of a customer during an ATM robbery); Page v. American Nat'l
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D. APPLICATION OF THE TESTS BY ILLINOIS COURTS

Previously, the Illinois courts strictly applied the prior similar incidents
test in determining the foreseeability of criminal acts of third parties. 9'
However, the Illinois courts appeared to move towards the application of the
totality of the circumstances test in Rowe v. State Bank.96 In Rowe, the
Illinois Supreme Court considered not only prior criminal acts that had
occurred at the location, but also other circumstances, such as the relatively
low cost the business owner would have incurred in providing adequate
security measures. 97 Nevertheless, the Illinois courts took an apparent step
backwards in a recent class action suit against an ATM network.98 In
Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 99 an Illinois appellate court seemed to require
specific allegations of locations and times at which future ATM crime would
occur in order to establish foreseeability and thus give rise to a duty to
protect ATM users from such crime."
Even though Illinois courts have thus far refused to adopt the test, a
totality of the circumstances analysis is the best approach for determining
the foreseeability of criminal acts of third parties. As the Isaacs court
noted, the totality of the circumstances test protects the first victim of a
crime by allowing him or her a possible recovery from the business
owner. I0 1 In addition, the court noted that the test reduces arbitrary results
which occur from the different approaches by the courts in applying the
Bank and Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d 133, 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding a bank not liable
for the injuries a customer suffered during an ATM robbery). Accord Berdeaux v. City Nat'l
Bank, 424 So. 2d 594, 595 (Ala. 1982) (holding a bank not liable to a customer shot during
a bank robbery); Drake v. Sun Bank and Trust Co., 377 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (determining a bank had no liability for the murder of a customer that occurred
after he was kidnapped from the bank's parking lot); McKinney v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank, 416
So. 2d 948, 952 (La. Ct. App. 1982) ("[B]anks do not differ from other businesses to the
extent that they should be subjected to a higher standard of care."). But see Stalzer v.
European Am. Bank, 448 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) ("[T]he very special
character and purpose of a bank ... makes a bank quite different from any other store or
commercial premises.").
95. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hocker, 428 N.E.2d 662 (III. App. Ct. 1981); see also supra
notes 47-57 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the test by the Taylor
court).
96. 531 N.E.2d 1358 (Iii. 1988).
97. Id. at 1370.
98. See Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1150 (111. App. Ct. 1992).
99. 613 N.E.2d 1150 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992).
100. Id. at 1153.
101. See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658 (Cal. 1985). See
also supra text accompanying notes 76-82 (discussing policy reasoning behind the adoption
of the totality of the circumstances test).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

prior similar incidents test, which allows different standards for foreseeability. 0 2 Finally, the totality of the circumstances test assures that more
plaintiffs will get their day in court by having their cases decided by the
trier of fact.1" 3
Even though the totality of the circumstances test does provide a better
opportunity for successful litigation to an ATM crime victim, common law
negligence still has too many problems to be an effective source of
protection for ATM consumers. Besides the different approaches among the
states in determining duty and the foreseeability of harm, there is also no
common standard of care that banks should follow in providing ATM
security. Thus, determining whether a bank has breached the standard of
care is an extremely difficult task. The existence of a federal standard
would help establish the minimum level of reasonable conduct for banks.
In addition, as at least one court has pointed out, a legislative body is a
more appropriate forum to address the protection of ATM users, develop a
°4 Therefore,
suitable protection scheme and mandate its implementation.,
a discussion of relevant federal legislation and its application to the ATM
crime problem is helpful.

II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANK SECURITY MEASURES
A. BANK PROTECTION ACT

10 5 in
Congress passed the Bank Protection Act of 1968 ("BPA")
response to "the rising number of robberies which have plagued banks and
savings and loan associations.'0 6 The BPA requires the responsible
federal supervisory agencies to establish minimum security standards for all
financial institutions in order to deter potential crime and aid in the
17
Subsequently, the
apprehension and conviction of bank robbers. "

102. Id. at 659. See supra notes 43-66 and accompanying text (discussing the different
standards for foreseeability).
103. Id.
104. Popp, 613 N.E.2d at 1155.
105. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1881-84 (1988).
106. S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2530, 2530. The Senate cited Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics that showed
robberies against financial institutions had risen much more rapidly than other types of
robberies, by a jump of 154% during a six-year period prior to the enactment of the BPA.
Id. at 2531.
107. See 12 U.S.C. § 1882(a) (1988). The statute states:
[E~ach Federal supervisory agency shall promulgate rules establishing
minimum standards with which each bank or savings and loan association
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supervisory agencies' 0 8 collaborated in drafting Regulation P, which
implements the BPA.' °9
Regulation P requires financial institutions to designate a security
officer to be responsible for implementing a security program that includes
certain minimum procedures and devices."0 However, only four specific
security devices are required: a vault to protect cash, a lighting system for
illuminating the vault, tamper-resistant locks on exterior doors and windows,
and an alarm system to notify law enforcement officials of attempted
robberies."' In addition, security cameras are encouraged, but are not
required. 2

must comply with respect to the installation, maintenance, and operation of
security devices and procedures, reasonable in cost, to discourage robberies,
burglaries, and larcenies and to assist in the identification and apprehension
of persons who commit such acts.
Id. Coincidentally, some of the same circumstances that Congress blamed for the increase
in bank crimes foreshadow the current ATM crime problem.
The tendency in recent years for financial institutions to branch into less
protected . . . areas may be one factor responsible for the increase in
assaults upon banks and savings and loan associations. Financial institutions are more vulnerable in these areas where there is generally less police
protection ....
Another factor in the sharp increase in bank crimes may be attributed to
bank design, which usually places more emphasis on customer convenience
than on bank security.
S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2530,
2532 (emphasis added).
108. The Comptroller of the Currency is responsible for all national and district banks,
the Federal Reserve System is responsible for all Federal Reserve Banks and State banks
which are members of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation is responsible for all insured state banks which are not members of the Federal
Reserve System, and the Office of Thrift Supervision is responsible for all insured savings
and loan associations. See 12 U.S.C. § 1881 (1988).
109. While each regulatory agency has separate regulations, they are all virtually
identical and collectively known as Regulation P. Hereinafter, when the Code of Federal
Regulations ("C.F.R.") is cited, it may be presumed to be applicable to all financial
institutions.
Moreover, Regulation P does apply to ATMs. ATMs are included in the definition
of Remote Service Units ("RSUs") in Banks and Banking, 12 C.F.R. § 545.141(a)(3) (1994).
One of the provisions of this regulation is that "[a]ll RSUs shall meet the minimum security
device requirements of Part 568 of this chapter as though such units were offices." Id. §
545.141 (e).
110. See Banks and Banking, 12 C.F.R. §§ 21.2-21.3 (1994).
111. Id. § 21.3(b).
112. Id. § 21.3(a)(2)(ii).
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Originally, Regulation P contained precise specifications for the security
3 These
devices which were used at financial institutions and ATMs."
specifications were eliminated in 1991 because they were rendered obsolete
4 In place of the
by advancements in the technology of the industry."
specific equipment requirements, an element was added that allows the
bank's security officer to include additional security devices that are deemed
Regulation P specifies that in determining what other
appropriate."'
security devices are appropriate, banks should consider, among other things,
prior incidence of crime against financial institutions in the area, the amount
of valuables exposed to robbery, the physical characteristics of the banking
facility, the presence of other security measures at the facility, and the cost
of the security devices." 6 The purpose of these added elements of the
regulation is to allow the bank's security officer to evaluate the security
equipment currently available on the market and determine which devices
meet the requirements of the individual facility."'
Even with this new subjective regulation, the regulatory agencies still
expect banks to identify the level of risk to their institutions and adopt an
Nevertheless, some industry experts
appropriate security program."'
believe that because of this subjective approach, financial institutions will
actually reduce security measures at branches and ATMs in an effort to cut
costs.'' 9 While the BPA calls for civil penalties of up to $100 per day for
20
qoncompliance with Regulation p, one regulatory agency admits "that
2
there have not been any, or only a minimal number of, monetary citations."' '
113. For instance, the regulations required the storage chests and deposit chests of an
ATM to be composed of a certain thickness of steel. 12 C.F.R. app. A(4)(v) (before
amended).
In addition, the ATMs were required to meet minimum weight and anchoring specifications.
Id.
114. See, e.g., Minimum Security Devices and Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 29,565 (Office
of Thrift Supervision 1991) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 568).
115. E.g., Banks and Banking, 12 C.F.R. § 21.3(b)(5) (1994).
116. Id. § 21.3(b)(5)(i)-(vi).
117. Minimum Security Devices and Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 29,565.
118. Id.
119. See Joseph Harrington, New Pressures Put Securit' Officers on Guard, SAVINGS
INSTITUTIONS, July 1990, at 35. According to Brian McGinley, Vice President of Corporate
Security at Citibank in Chicago, Illinois, "[financial institutions] may attempt to fund other
programs at the expense of security programs." Id. at 36. In fact, the regulatory agencies
stated that they expect that the revisions in the regulation, which provide flexibility in
devising security programs, will allow financial institutions to reduce their costs. Minimum
Security Devices and Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 29,566 (1991).
120. 12 U.S.C. § 1884 (1988).
121. Harrington, supra note 119, at 36.
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A few bank crime victims have brought civil suits against financial
institutions based on alleged violations of the BPA and Regulation P. In
these instances, the existence of a private cause of action under the BPA has
been denied. 122 In Page v. American National Bank & Trust, 23 the
plaintiff was injured during a robbery at the defendant's ATM.'24 The
plaintiff claimed that the bank was negligent because of violations of
Regulation p. 25 The jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded
damages of $135,000.126 In reversing the judgment, a Tennessee appellate
court determined that the plaintiff could not base an action on Regulation
P because she was not within the class of persons the statute was intended
to protect."' In so deciding, the court focused on the security device
specifications of Regulation P and determined that the provisions were not
intended to reduce assaults on ATM users, but rather, the regulations were
to prevent the ATM itself from being burglarized1 28
In Sadler v. Citibank, 29 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of whether the BPA created a private cause of action. 130
The court determined that, because the BPA contains no express private
right of action, the Supreme Court's analysis in Cort v. Ash'13 must be
applied to determine whether the BPA creates an implicit private right of
action. 132 In applying the Cort analysis, several factors are relevant. First,
was the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit-the statute was
enacted? In other words, did the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff?133 Second, was there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create or deny such a remedy? 34 Third, was imply122. See Sadler v. Citibank, 947 F.2d 642, 644 (2d Cir. 1991); Bowden v. McAndrew,
434 N.W.2d 195, 199 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Page v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust, 850
S.W.2d 133, 139-40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
123. 850 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
124. Id. at 133.
125. Id. at 134. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the bank had not installed
security cameras or burglar alarms, nor placed the ATM in a well-lighted area, as required
by the regulation. ld.
126. Id. at 135.
127. Id. at 140.
128. Id. at 139. Note that this case was decided before the revisions of Regulation P,
which deleted these equipment specifications. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying
text (discussing the specific equipment requirements of Regulation P).
129. 947 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1991).
130. Id. at 643-44.
131. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
132. Sadler, 947 F.2d at 643-44.
133. Id. (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
134. Id.
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ing a remedy for the plaintiff consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme?' 35 Finally, was the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
it would
1
law?'
In answering the first question, the Sadler court determined that the
BPA was intended to prevent theft that would deplete 37federal insurance
The court apfunds, and not to protect individual bank customers.1
peared to ignore the legislative history of the BPA that suggests that the
protection of bank customers was one of the primary reasons for its
enactment. 38 In analyzing whether there was any indication of legislative
intent to either create or deny a private cause of action, the court decided
that, because the BPA contains a measure for civil penalties against banks
39 it would be inconsistent to imply a private
that violate the regulation,
remedy. 140
B. OTHER FEDERAL REGULATION

Additional federal regulation which affects ATMs is the Electronic
42
4
The purpose of
Fund Transfer Act ("EFTA") ' and Regulation E.'

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. The senate report reads:
While most banking institutions are insured against losses from robberies and
similar crimes, the dollar value of these losses is large and is increasing at a rapid
rate.... However, imore important than these nionetay), losses are the injuries and
deaths often suffered by bank employees and customers during bank holdups....
[D]uring 1967, 23 persons were killed and 61 persons were injured as a result of
bank robberies. Most were innocent victims, including bank employees, customers,
and police officers. Clearly, the large number of injuries and deaths in 1967
indicates a pressing need for this type of legislation.
S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2530,
Ct.
2531-32 (emphasis added).But see Bowden v. McAndrew, 434 N.W.2d 195, 199 (Mich.
appears
crime
bank
of
victim
a
while
that,
deciding
and
issue
this
App. 1988) (addressing
to be one who would benefit from the statute, the statute was enacted to protect the public
in general, and not to confer a private cause of action).
139. "A bank or savings and loan association which violates a rule promulgated
pursuant to this chapter shall be subject to a civil penalty which shall not exceed $100 for
each day of the violation." 12 U.S.C. § 1884 (1988).
140. Sadler, 947 F.2d at 644.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1988).
142. Electronic Funds Transfers, 12 C.F.R. § 205 (1994) (commonly known as
Regulation E, which implements EFTA).
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EFTA is to establish the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of parties
participating in electronic fund transfer systems.' 43 Moreover, the primary
objective of EFTA is to provide individual consumers with financial
protection.'" EFTA primarily protects individual consumers by limiting a
consumer's liability for unauthorized transfers to fifty dollars or the amount
of unauthorized transfers that occur before the consumer notifies the bank
45
of the lost or stolen debit card, whichever amount is less.
An "unauthorized electronic fund transfer" is defined as any electronic
fund transfer from a consumer's account initiated by a person other than the
consumer without actual authority to initiate the transfer and from which the
consumer receives no benefit. 46 The term does not include any electronic
fund transfer initiated by a person who was furnished with the access device
to the consumer's account by the consumer, unless the consumer has
notified the financial institution involved that the transfers by that person are
no longer authorized. 47 Considering this definition, one can envision a
scenario wherein a bank customer is kidnapped and forced to withdraw
money from an ATM. It would seem that this situation would not qualify
as an unauthorized transfer and so the customer would have to bear the
entire financial lOSS. 4 8 However, the Federal Reserve later added two
situations to the definition of unauthorized transfers: (1) when the bank card
is stolen from the consumer and then used to obtain funds and, (2) when the
consumer is forced to withdraw cash by a robber."' Therefore, if an
ATM user is forced to withdraw money by a robber, the user's loss would
be limited to fifty dollars. 50
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(b). Electronic fund transfer (EFT)is defined as "any transfer
of funds ... that is initiated through an electronic terminal ... for the purpose of ordering,
instructing, or authorizing a financial institution to debit or credit an account. The term
includes ... automated teller machine transfers .... 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(g) (1994).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(b). See also 12 C.F.R. § 205. "This regulation is intended to
carry out the purpose of the Act, including primarily, the protection of individual consumers
engaging in electronic transfers." Id. § 205.1(b) (emphasis added).
145. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b) (1994).
146. 12 C.F.R. § 205.2() (1994).
147. Id.
148. This is because this situation would qualify as either (1) a transaction initiated by
the consumer, albeit by force, or (2) a transaction initiated by a person, the kidnapper, who
was furnished with the access device by the consumer. Both situations appear to meet the
requirements of an authorized transfer. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
149. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (Supp. I12-27-28) (1994).
150. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of
consumer liability for unauthorized EFT transactions). However, if an ATM user withdraws
cash from an ATM and then is immediately robbed, the user would suffer the entire loss
because the transaction meets all the requirements of an authorized fund transfer.
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While this expansion of Regulation E acknowledges that ATM users
are potential victims of crime and increases the financial protection of EFT
consumers, it does nothing to physically protect an ATM user. The only
move in Congress to expand the physical protection of ATM users beyond
the minimal standards provided by the BPA and EFTA was attempted by
51 His bill, the ATM
former New York Representative Mario Biaggi.'
Crime Prevention Act, 152 would have required all ATMs to have customeractivated emergency alarms, monitored surveillance cameras and limitedaccess enclosures. 53 Nevertheless, the ATM Crime Prevention Act never
54
advanced pass the committee stage.
It appears that thus far, federal regulation has been ineffective in
addressing ATM crime, protecting ATM users, or establishing a standard of
care to guide financial institutions in providing security measures.
Therefore, state and local regulation must be examined in order to determine
whether it provides a solution to the problems associated with ATM crime.
III. STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION
A. ILLINOIS REGULATORY ACTIVITY

The State of Illinois has imposed regulations similar to the federal
155
However, the
regulations on financial institutions and the use of ATMs.
main objective of the Illinois regulation also appears to be just the financial
protection of bank consumers. Although the stated purpose of the Electronic
56
Fund Transfer Transmission Facility Act' ("EFTA") is the adequate
57
protection of the rights of the people,' adequate protection is to be
accomplished by encouraging economically viable and technologically
59 Proreliable networks' 58 and by competition among EFT suppliers.
tection against theft or criminal attack is barely addressed in the regulation.
For instance, the main device "[t]o assure maximum safety and security

151.

See Anderson, supra note 15, at 12.

152. H.R. 5238, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
153. See 132 CONG. REc. E2635 (1986). See also Anderson, supra note. 15, at 12.
Congressman Biaggi drafted the bill after one of his staff members was robbed at an ATM.

Id.

154. See Anderson, supra note 15, at 12.
155. See Illinois Banking Act, 205 ILCS 5 (1993); Electronic Fund Transfer
Transmission Facility Act, 205 ILCS 615 (1993).
156. 205 ILCS 615 (1993).
157. 205 ILCS 615/2-100(2).
158. Id.
159. 205 ILCS 615/2-100(3). See stilra note 143 for a definition of EFT.
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against malfunction, fraud, theft, and other accidents or abuses" is to ensure
that all ATMs accept all available access devices."
EFTTA limits the liability of consumers for unauthorized electronic
fund transfers much like the federal EFTA does.' 6' The Illinois legislation
also defines an unauthorized electronic fund transfer identically to the
federal regulation.162 However, unlike Regulation E, there has been no
movement to expand the Illinois statute to protect consumers from financial
loss from such occurrences as a forced transaction.163 Moreover, the
Illinois statute contains a provision that may serve as an "escape clause" for
banks faced with litigation for ATM crime.64 In addition to EFTTA, the
IllinoisBanking Act regulates ATMs, but only in mandating the number of
65
ATM locations a bank may operate.
There has been recent movement in the Illinois legislature that does
show an increased concern about ATM crime.' 66 Most applicable is a
proposed amendment to EFTTA that requires urban financial institutions to
provide an ATM at a police station.167 There are several weaknesses to
this proposal. First, it is only applicable to cities with a population of
100,000 or more.168 The inapplicability of the proposal to smaller cities
totally ignores the need to protect all ATM users. 169 Second, the proposal
appears to require the installation of only one ATM in any city of more than

160. 205 ILCS 615/8-103. This appears to be another protection of a consumer-related
right by ensuring that a customer with any bank card can use any ATM.
161. Compare 205 ILCS 615/9-105 (setting out a consumer's liability for an
unauthorized transaction) with 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b) (1994) (establishing a consumer's
liability for an unauthorized transaction in the federal regulation).
162. Compare 205 ILCS 615/3-117 (defining an unauthorized electronic fund transfer)
with 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(l) (1994) (defining an unauthorized electronic fund transfer in the
federal regulation).
163. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text (noting that the federal regulation,
EFTA, protects consumers financially when they are victims of certain crimes).
164. See 205 ILCS 615/9-106(b)(1). "A financial institution shall not be liable ...if
the financial institution shows ... that its actions or failure to act resulted from: (I) an act
of God or other circumstance beyond its control ..... Id.
165. See 205 ILCS 5/5(16).
166. For instance, one recent bill proposed to make it a Class B misdemeanor to loiter
within one hundred feet of an ATM. H.R. 2078, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. (III. 1993).
167. See S. 1132, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. (III. 1993). There have been similar proposals
for comparable city ordinances in Chicago, Illinois and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. See Robert
Davis, Burke Backs ATMs for Police Stations, CHI. TRIB., July 22, 1993, § 2, at 2;
Milwaukee Urged to Put ATMs in Police Stations, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1993, § I, at 3.
168. S. 1132, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. (II1. 1993).
169. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing violent crime problems in
smaller communities).
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100,000 people.' ° This would most likely be very inconvenient to a large
portion of bank customers. Third, the installation of the ATM is only
7
municipalirequired upon the request of the municipality.' ' Realistically,
72 Finally, there
project.
this
with
involved
ties may not want to become
would actually feel safer using an
is some concern whether bank customers
t71
station.
ATM installed in a police
This proposal to provide a "safe-haven" ATM is a step in the right
direction; however, it does not go far enough to protect all ATM users. In
fact, the proposal may provide more protection for the financial institution
than bank customers. For instance, why is only one "safe" ATM required
for any city over 100,000? It seems that if this plan were implemented, and
a bank customer was injured during a robbery at an ATM other than the one
of risk
assumption
in the police station, then the bank would have a strong
174
user.
ATM
the
by
brought
defense against any litigation
The largest proponent in Illinois for mandating ATM security standards
has been Chicago Alderman Edward Burke, who chairs a task force on
ATM safety.1 75 Over the past few years, Burke has proposed several
different requirements for ATM sites, including restricting the hours of
operation, requiring customer-activated surveillance systems, requiring city
76
approval and licensing of ATM locations,' and installing ATMs in police
77 No action has been taken on any of Burke's proposals other
stations.
than to continue studying the problem. Such inaction is primarily due to the
lobbying of Chicago's banking community and its continued promises to

170. S. 1132, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. (III. 1993).
171. Id.
172. One critic of the proposal noted that most police stations are ill-equipped to handle
the pedestrian or vehicular traffic that ATMs would generate. Banking at the Cop Shop?,
Rodriguez,
CHi. TRIB., July 25, 1993, § 4, at 2. Chicago Police Superintendent, Matt
must
concerns
other
and
parking
that
suggests
and
proposal
the
of
questions the practicality
television
(NBC
Ten
at
News
5
Channel
project.
the
consider
would
he
before
addressed
be
broadcast, Oct. 14, 1993).
173. "[A]nyone who has spent time inside a busy police station may wonder if
customers would feel safer amid the comings and goings of bloody-nosed crime victims and
drunken arrestees." Banking at the Cop Shop?, supra note 172, at 2.
174. In addition, there may be other motives behind the proposed regulation. Chicago
Alderman Edward Burke has repeatedly promoted his similar proposal for city legislation by
touting the potential revenue that could be raised by leasing space in police stations to banks
for their ATMs. Davis, supra note 167, at 2. See also Banking at the Cop Shop?, supra
note 172, at 2.
175. See generally Ringer, supra note 6, at 6; Davis, sqpra note 167.
176. See Ringer, supra note 6, at 6. See also Davis, stipra note 167.
177. Davis, supra note 167, at 2.
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voluntarily address the issue of ATM security- 78
B. OTHER STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION

Until recently, few states had enacted any legislation addressing ATM
crime or the security requirements for ATM sites. Nevertheless, because of
the growing incidence of this type of criminal activity and, perhaps, because
of the failure of federal regulations, an increasing number of states and
municipalities have enacted laws in this area.
California recently enacted the most comprehensive state legislation
regarding minimum ATM security standards. 79 The law requires financial
institutions to evaluate the safety of all ATM locations, including a
consideration of the presence of landscaping and other obstructions in the
area of the ATM, the access and parking areas, the incidence of violent
crimes in the ATM area, and minimum lighting standards.18 0 The law also
requires that all ATM users be notified of basic safety precautions they
should take when using an ATM. 8'
In addition to California, both Oregon and Washington recently passed
similar statutes 8 2 and other states have bills pending.183 In 1993, New
York City enacted the nation's strictest ATM safety standards.1 8 This
legislation requires all ATMs to be equipped with a surveillance camera
capable of viewing and recording the traffic flow of an ATM facility,
reflective mirrors or surfaces to provide users a rear view, and entry doors
with locks requiring an ATM card or access code for entry to enclosed
ATMs.185 The legislation faced tough opposition from the city's banking

178. Id. See also Matt Barthel, Bankers in Chicago Keep Negotiating To Avert ATM
Laws, AM. BANKER, July 28, 1993, at 3.
179. See CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 13000-13070 (West Supp. 1995).
180. Id. § 13030.
181. Id. § 13050.
182. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 714.280-.315 (1993) (establishing safety standards for
ATMs and requiring customer education); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.174.010-.900 (Supp.
1993) (providing security and minimum lighting requirements for ATMs).
183. See, e.g., A.B. 11808, 215th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.Y. 1994) (requiring security devices
at ATMs).
184. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-160 (Supp. 1993); see also Mark
Arend, Should ATM Security Be Legislated?, ABA BANKING J., June 1992, at 50; Matt
Barthel, N.Y.C. Banks Ready as Tough ATM Security Law Kicks hi, AM. BANKER, Feb. 11,
1993, at 3 (discussing the possible effects of the ordinance on the city's banking business).
185. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-160(b). The enforcement of the
requirement for a door entry system was delayed a year while a task force studies the
available technology and its benefits. See id. § 10-160 note (legislative intent). See also
Barthel, supra note 184, at 3.
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186
community, due mainly to the supposed high cost of compliance.
Nevertheless, institutions that do not comply face penalties of up to one
thousand dollars per day for each violation.87
The failure of Illinois lawmakers to follow the lead of these other
communities and states in implementing ATM security laws leaves Illinois
ATM consumers physically unprotected. Moreover, the ambiguity and
subjectivity of present federal and state regulation does little to provide
either consumer protection or a common standard of care to guide financial
institutions.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is apparent that Illinois needs to regulate the area of ATM security
and it should do so by adopting legislation based primarily on the best
elements of both the California statute and the New York City ordinance.
What follows are the minimum requirements that should be embodied in the
statute.
1. All financial institutions shall adopt procedures for evaluating the safety
188
This evaluation shall
of all current and prospective ATM locations.
include, but is not limited to, a consideration of:
(a) the presence of landscaping, vegetation, or other obstructions in
the area of the ATM, parking area, or immediate vicinity;"'
9°
(b) the compliance with minimum lighting standards;"
(c) the occurrence of regular inspections in order to discover and
correct circumstances such as burned out bulbs, vandalized lights,
and differences in lighting conditions caused by changes in the
seasons; 191 and
186. See Barthel, stqwra note 184, at 3. Chemical Bank Corporation claims to have
spent $3.5 million, or about $17,500 per site, to bring its ATMs into compliance with the
law. Id.
187. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-160(e).

188. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 13030 (West Supp. 1995).
189. See id. § 13030(b). Open locations often deter criminals from selecting a
particular site for an attack because of the increased likelihood of being witnessed. See
Hawthorne, supra note 3, at 34.
190. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 13041 (West Supp. 1995); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
§ 10-160(a)(6) (Supp. 1993). For instance, the California statute requires a minimum
illumination of ten candlefoot power at the face of the ATM and extending unobstructed
outward at least five additional feet. CAL. FIN. CODE § 1304 1(a). In addition, a lesser level
of illumination is required to extend at least fifty feet beyond the face of the ATM and for
the parking area. Id. § 13041(b)-(c).
191. See Wipprecht, supra note 16, at 35. Wipprecht, the director of security at Wells
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(d) the incidence of all violent and property crimes in the immediate
neighborhood of the ATM, as reflected in the records of the local
law enforcement agency.' 92
2. Specific minimum security devices shall be required at each ATM
location, including:
(a) a video surveillance camera capable of viewing and recording not
only the ATM user but also the traffic flow of the surrounding
93
area;

(b) a mirror or reflective surface installed above the ATM in order to
provide a rear view for the user;' 9
(c) additional mirrors installed to allow the user to view into blind
spots that exist within the facility or around corners; 95
(d) a type of customer-activated alarm allowing users to directly alert
police or other security personnel of emergency situations;196
(1) Either a "panic-button" or a telephone installed at the ATM
will satisfy this requirement.
(2) If the video camera installed in order to meet the requirement
of section 2(a) is also a surveillance camera monitored by
Fargo Bank of San Francisco, suggests that adequate lighting may bc the best deterrent of
ATM crime. Id.
192. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 13030(c) (West Supp. 1995). Not only prior incidents of
violent crime should be considered. As noted by the Delaware Supreme Court, property
crimes can also become violent. All crimes must be examined in order to determine whether
an ATM location is reasonably safe. See Jardel v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 525 (Del. 1987).
In addition, crimes committed at any type of business in the immediate area should be
analyzed. Consideration of prior criminal acts perpetrated against only banks ignores the
growing occurrence of forced ATM withdrawals as an "add-on" crime. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text (discussing ATM robbery as an "add-on" to other violent crimes).
193. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-160(b)(l) (Supp. 1993). Some ATMs
are equipped with a camera inside the machine that can only view people standing directly
in front of the ATM. As previously noted, this type of security camera is installed primarily
to protect the bank's investment in the ATM. See stpra note 15 and accompanying text.
However, cameras installed outside the ATM or within a vestibule that can view the entire
area serve as a greater deterrent to crime and a more effective tool in investigating crimes
that do occur. See Hawthorne, stqira note 3, at 37.
194. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-160(b)(6). This way a user can watch
to see if a possible robber is approaching from behind.
195. See id. § 10-160(b)(7).
196. See Hawthorne, supra note 3, at 37. Critics of legislation aire opposed to this
particular requirement, claiming that the costs involved are prohibitive and that the devices
are ineffective. See Arend, supra note 184, at 52. Nevertheless, both panic-buttons and
surveillance cameras have been proven effective in other high risk environments, such as
parking ramps. See Michelle Litvin, Security Measures; Fighting Crime in Parking Lots,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 21, 1993, § 17, at I, 5.
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personnel during all hours of ATM operation, it will also
satisfy this requirement.
entry doors requiring a valid ATM card with access code
locked
(e)
for entry into enclosed ATMs;' 97
(1) This requirement shall have a delayed effective date while
awaiting the results of98the New York City task force investigating its feasibility.1
(2) If the required technology proves to be unavailable or
unreasonably cost prohibitive, rendering the requirement of
section 2(e) infeasible, then one of the following shall be
imposed:
(a) a ban on outdoor ATMs;' 99
2
(b) a restriction of ATM operation to daylight hours; 00 or
(c) the posting of a security guard at all ATMs after regular
banking hours.20 '
3. A customer education program shall be implemented by the financial
institution. The program shall be designed to inform customers about the
risks associated with using ATMs and teach them how to protect themselves
while using an ATM. The following are the minimum requirements of the
education program.
(a) The financial institution shall notify all customers about the basic
safety precautions which they should employ while using an
ATM.20 2 This requirement is satisfied if ATM customers are
advised to:
(1) be aware of their surroundings, especially after dark;
(2) consider having someone accompany them when using an
ATM;
(3) refrain from displaying their cash while at an ATM and count
the cash later in a safe place;

197. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-160(b)(2).

198. See id. § 10-160(c).
199. See Arend, supra note 184, at 50.

200. See id. at 52.

201. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-160(b)(2). These requirements for
specific security devices are reasonable considering the high risk of danger to ATM users.
In addition, the requirements are flexible enough to allow for technological advancement in
the industry, without rendering them obsolete like the former Regulation P requirements.

Moreover, the requirements are precise enough to eliminate any subjectivity involved in
determining what security devices to install at an ATM. This ensures a consistent level of
safety at all ATMs.
202. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 13050 (West Supp. 1995); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
§ 10-160(b)(8).
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(4) consider using another ATM or delaying the transaction if
they notice anything suspicious while at the ATM or in the
immediate area; and
(5) report all crimes that do occur, not only to the financial
institution, but also to the local law enforcement agency.20 3
(b) A financial institution shall notify all ATM customers regarding
2°4
any criminal activity that occurs at any of its ATM locations.
(c)

All financial institutions are encouraged to perform other educational activities, such as presenting safety reminders on ATM
screens during transactions, mailing additional educational
materials in monthly statements, or providing safety training
sessions when new customers open accounts.2 °5
4. Penalties
(a) A financial institution that fails to comply with these regulations
shall be subject to a civil penalty of one thousand dollars for the
first day of violation and two hundred fifty dollars for each
additional day. z°6
(b) Penalties collected shall be used to fund a compensation program
for victims of violent ATM crime. 0 7
(c) All financial institutions shall be audited annually to ensure
compliance with the statute.20 8
5. There is no duty imposed on any financial institution to relocate
existing ATMs that fail to comply with the safety evaluation or minimum
security device requirements.2 °
(a) Existing ATM locations that do not comply with the statute by a
predetermined future date shall be shut down until the ATM is
brought into compliance.
(b) A financial institution that refuses to comply with the regulation
203. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 660.215 (Michic 1992).
204. While this will not inform customers about all ATM crime, it will help educate

them of the real possibility of violent ATM crime and allow them to make an informed
decision about using ATMs.
205. See Wipprecht, supra note 16, at 35; Hawthorne, supra note 3, at 37. See also
Arend, supra note 184, at 52 (discussing an ATM network that produced a safety video to
educate ATM customers).
206. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-160(e).
207. See generally Michael Hedges, The Fear Business Explodes; Violent Crine Hits
Too Close to Home, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1993, at Al (regarding victim compensation

funds).
208. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-160(h).
209. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 13031 (West Supp. 1995).
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of section 5(e) by the predetermined date shall also be subject to
the appropriate penalties.
6. The minimum standards set forth by this statute shall serve as the
standard of care required by the financial institutions to meet the duty owed
to their customers. 1
(a) An ATM user who is the victim of a criminal attack by a third
party may bring a negligence action against the financial institution that operates the ATM.
(b) Failure by any financial institution to comply with any section of
this statute is prima facie evidence of a breach of the standard of
care.
(c) Compliance with the entire statute constitutes a rebuttable
presumption that the financial institution has not breached the
standard of care.2 1
(d) A financial institution may still be found negligent for the
continued operation of an ATM that suffers repeated criminal
attacks, even if the ATM complies with the statute.
7. Financial institutions may add a reasonable surcharge to their ATM
transaction fee.212
(a) This surcharge shall represent only the actual additional operating
costs incurred by the financial institution in providing the security
devices necessary to comply with this statute.
(b) The state has the authority to evaluate and reduce the surcharge if
2 3
it determines that the fee is unreasonable.

210. See id.
211. See OR. REv. STAT. § 714.315 (1993).
212. See S. 1132, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. (I11.1993). It is fair and equitable that the cost
of taking reasonable measures to protect consumers from criminal activity be borne by the
owner and, indirectly, the ATM customers. See, e.g., Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d
43, 49 (Colo. 1987). Accord Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984).
It is also not unfair that patrons pay a few cents more ... and gain the
assurance of reasonable protection against criminal activity ... rather than
allow the emotional and physical burden of a criminal attack to fall on the
store patron who inadvertently finds himself or herself in the middle of a
robbery invited by the store's failure to employ minimal crime deterrence
measures.
Id. at 579.
213. See S. 1132, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. (Iii. 1993).
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CONCLUSION

The immediate need for Illinois legislation in the area of ATM safety
is clear. The proliferation of ATMs continues at a steady pace. Consumers
have responded to this increase in machine availability by adopting ATMs
as part oftheir everyday lives. The number of ATM transactions being
conducted has grown enormously in recent years. As a result of this jump
in usage, crimes occurring at ATMs have also steadily increased. These
crimes are usually violent in nature and the victims run a high risk of
personal injury, or even death. Nevertheless, the financial industry has
generally not responded to the increased risk to its customers with any type
of added safety measures.
While a crime victim can always sue a negligent ATM operator, as of
yet, litigants have been generally unsuccessful. Common law negligence has
too many problems to serve as an effective means of protecting or
compensating an ATM crime victim. The states take several varying
approaches in determining whether any duty exists to protect business
invitees from criminal attack, and Illinois courts have been slow in
recognizing the existence of this duty. In addition, there is no clearly
defined standard of care for the banks to follow in providing reasonable
safety measures.
Federal and Illinois banking regulations, because of their subjective
approach, fail to provide a minimum standard of care. Rather, these codes
are generally focused on protecting the banks and their customers financially, despite the original purpose of the legislation to increase the physical
safety of customers. Moreover, the recently proposed Illinois legislation
falls extremely short, as it fails to require physical protection for all ATM
users. Other states and cities have taken ATM crime seriously and
responded by requiring banks to provide adequate security measures to deter
and prevent crime.
The statute recommended in this comment provides strict measures
requiring banks to evaluate existing and future ATM locations and consider
customer safety as one of the primary goals in selecting and maintaining an
ATM site. In addition, a minimum level of security devices is required to
be installed at every ATM. This provides a consistently safe environment
for all consumers. Also, devices are required so the user can quickly notify
emergency personnel in case a crime is threatened or occurs.
This statute also serves as a common standard of care, so that a crime
victim has a realistic chance of succeeding in litigation against a negligent
financial institution. In addition, a fund is established in order to compensate innocent victims of ATM crimes that otherwise have no means of
recovery. Financial institutions benefit from the legislation because a clear
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standard of care is defined, providing them guidance in selecting and
operating ATMs. Moreover, the banks are allowed to spread the increased
costs of required security devices among the ATM users. Most importantly,
this solution will help achieve the original goal of federal legislation; to
protect bank customers by "reducing the rising number of robberies which
214

have plagued banks.1'

GREGoRY W. HosKiNs

214. S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2530, 2530.

